Entropy of Spacelike Two-Surfaces of Spacetime by Makela, J. & Peltola, A.
ar
X
iv
:g
r-q
c/
04
06
03
2v
1 
 8
 Ju
n 
20
04
Entropy of Spacelike Two-Surfaces of Spacetime
Jarmo Ma¨kela¨∗ and Ari Peltola†
Department of Physics, University of Jyva¨skyla¨, PB 35 (YFL), FIN-40351 Jyva¨skyla¨, Finland
We argue that every finite piecewise smooth spacelike two-surface of spacetime possesses an en-
tropy which is, in natural units, one quarter of its area. However, the thermodynamical properties
of a two-surface become apparent only to the observers having that two-surface as a horizon. Con-
sequences of this result are discussed.
PACS numbers: 04.70.Dy
The concept of black hole entropy was first properly introduced by Bekenstein in 1972 [1]. Inspired by Bekenstein’s
ideas, Hawking was able to show that black holes emit thermal radiation and that an exact expression for the black
hole entropy is, in SI units,
S =
1
4
kBc
3
h¯G
A, (1)
where A is the event horizon area of the black hole [2]. After Bekenstein and Hawking had published their results
it was found by Unruh that also the so-called Rindler horizon of an accelerated observer emits thermal radiation
[3]. This suggested that Rindler horizon possesses entropy in the same way as black holes. Finally, it was shown by
Padmanabhan that the usual thermodynamical properties, including entropy, may be associated with any spacetime
horizon, no matter whether we consider black hole, Rindler, de Sitter, or cosmological horizon [4]. In particular, it
turns out that the entropy of a finite part of any horizon is, in natural units, one quarter of the area of that part.
Therefore, it appears that entropy is a universal property of horizons.
Bekenstein’s original ideas were motivated mostly by the similarities between the second law of thermodynamics
and Hawking’s area theorem, which states that the area of the event horizon of a black hole cannot decrease in any
(classical) process. Bekenstein was also able to find an expression for the black hole entropy by using information
theory. It is a well-known fact that the entropy of a system measures the lack of information about the actual inner
structure of the system. Bekenstein’s idea was to consider the minimum increase in the area of an event horizon
resulting from a disappearance of a particle into the black hole. In this situation the entropy of a black hole can be
identified as the loss of information associated with the particle. In this sense, the entropy of a black hole may be
viewed to describe the lost information of matter inside the black hole.
It should be safe to say that at this stage of research we are not sure what happens to the information which
is lost inside a black hole. However, it is possible to find certain arguments which suggest that the information
concerning the microstates of a black hole is somehow related to the degrees of freedom at the event horizon of the
hole. Such arguments are provided, for instance, by the successes of loop quantum gravity [5]: If an appropriate
canonical quantization is performed to the classical spacetime outside the black hole, and the event horizon is treated
as a boundary, one obtains a theory which yields certain surface states. These states live on the horizon and they
can be identified as the microstates of the black hole. The entropy of the hole can be calculated by counting the
microstates. Thus, loop quantum gravity makes a claim that the entropy of a black hole is due to the microscopic
structure of spacetime at the horizon. There are good reasons to believe that a similar result holds for other spacetime
horizons as well. For instance, it was showed by Jacobson, among other things, that the thermal radiation of Rindler
horizon causes a change in the metric at the horizon in such a way that the area of the considered part of the horizon
shrinks [6]. His analysis suggests that not only the entropy of a black hole but also the entropy of a Rindler horizon
is related to the structure of spacetime at the horizon. As it comes to the other horizons of spacetime, it seems that
they also possess an entropy whose origin might be the same as in the cases of black hole and Rindler horizons.
These considerations prompt us to state the key assumption of our paper: We assume that the entropy of any
horizon is a consequence from the degrees of freedom at the horizon or, more precisely, from the microscopic structure
of spacetime at the horizon. Although, at this stage, there is no comprehensive proof of this statement, this view is
held, at least implicitly, by many physicists and it is closely related to the so-called holographic hypothesis [7]. Viewed
in this way, it would be more appropriate to talk about the entropy of the event horizon rather than the entropy of a
black hole.
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2What makes the spacetime horizons distinct from the other spacelike two-surfaces of spacetime? More precisely,
why should the notion of entropy to be associated with the spacetime horizons only? We stated above that there are
reasons to believe that the entropy corresponding to spacetime horizons is due to the microscopic degrees of freedom of
spacetime at the horizon. We should, however, expect that any spacelike two-surface has at least some kind of notion
of entropy since the microscopic structure of spacetime should be the same for all spacelike two-surfaces. Therefore,
we draw a general conclusion: Any finite part of any spacelike two-surface has an entropy which is one quarter of its
area.
Provided that one believes in the key assumption of our paper, this conclusion of ours follows from the results
derived for the Rindler horizon. In order to avoid any pathological behaviour we restrict our analysis to piecewise
smooth spacelike two-surfaces only. Our line of reasoning can be expressed in the following five steps:
(a) The entropy associated with each finite part of a Rindler horizon is one quarter of its area.
(b) Each finite spacelike two-plane is, according to a certain accelerated observer, a part of a Rindler horizon.
(c) Therefore, the entropy associated with each finite spacelike two-plane is one quarter of its area.
(d) Any piecewise smooth spacelike two-surface can be viewed as a union of infinitesimal spacelike two-planes, each
having an entropy equal to one quarter of its area.
(e) Therefore, the entropy associated with any finite piecewise smooth spacelike two-surface is one quarter of its
area.
Why do we not observe the entropy attributed to those spacelike two-surfaces which are not horizons? The answer
to this question is simple: Entropy of a system cannot be observed directly. In order to find a value for the entropy
of a system we must measure its temperature. Moreover, according to the first law of thermodynamics,
dE = TdS, (2)
the temperature of a system is associated with the changes in its entropy and energy. More precisely, we observe
a system to possess certain temperature because, during the act of observation, the entropy and the energy of the
system change such that the change of energy is proportional to the change of entropy. (Note that we do not have to
include a term analogous to pdV to Eq. (2) since we do not consider any exterior work to be done to our system.)
But this is exactly what happens when the two-surface under consideration is a horizon: Thermal radiation of a
horizon leads to a change in the spacetime geometry at the horizon in such a way that its area, and therefore entropy,
changes. Therefore the thermodynamical properties of horizons can be observed by measuring the temperature of
their radiation. However, there exists no such radiation mechanism for other spacelike two-surfaces and, in particular,
there is no change in entropy or energy. Therefore, the entropy of these spacelike two-surfaces remains “hidden” and
can be observed only by the observers having those two-surfaces as horizons.
In this paper we have proposed that every spacelike two-surface possesses an entropy proportional to its area. This
proposal does not contradict with known physics and it brings clarity to the concept of gravitational entropy: Entropy
is due to the microscopic structure of spacetime, and this microscopic structure, and therefore entropy, is the same for
all spacelike two-surfaces with the same area, no matter whether the two-surface under consideration is a horizon or
not. For the real understanding of these matters, however, one still has a long way to go since a completely satisfactory
theory of the microscopic structure of spacetime is still lacking.
One may ask, and perhaps even with some justification, what actually is the point of this paper? How can its
results be used? Indeed, if we really claim that spacelike two-surfaces have a certain entropy even when they are not
horizons, but in that case the entropy cannot be observed, it may appear that we are coming dangerously close in
spirit to the medieval scholastic arguments about how many angels can sit on a head of a pin. After all, physics is a
science which predicts observations.
Even if our proposal that all spacelike two-surfaces have a certain entropy did not have direct observational conse-
quences (a more detailed analysis may well reveal such consequences), however, the proposal may turn out a useful
guiding principle when one constructs microscopic theories of gravitational entropy. It is possible that an assumption
that the presence of a horizon is necessary for the production of gravitational entropy is ultimately an unnecessary
complication. The calculations of gravitational entropy may turn out much easier if one simply ignores an assump-
tion that a horizon is looked at, and instead employs a line of thought which would produce the same expression
for the entropy of all spacelike two-surfaces (such a line of thought has been used, for instance, in Ref. [8], for the
calculation of the entropy of the Schwarzschild black hole). It would be an interesting challenge to perform a detailed
analysis about whether an assumption of the presence of a horizon is really essential in the existing derivations of the
Bekenstein-Hawking entropy law from a microscopic theory of gravity, or is it just an unnecessary complication which
may be ignored. If it turns out that horizons are not really essential in these derivations, our proposal may possibly
3be elevated to the status of a general principle which should be reproduced, at least in the semiclassical limit, by
every plausible microscopic theory of gravity.
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